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ABSTRACT 
 National identity is a powerful category marker that has been found to influence people’s 
perceptions and judgments of social others. While one’s nationality is technically defined by 
circumstantial factors (e.g., birthplace, residence), as opposed to inherent or biological features, 
adults still describe their national identity as being extremely important to their personal identity 
(ANES, 2004), and strong national identification has profound—and often pernicious—
consequences for how one views national outgroups (e.g., Huynh, Devos, & Altman, 2015). 
Here, I explore the origins of national identity conceptions; specifically, I ask whether young 
children (beginning at age 5) are aware of the extrinsic determinants of nationality, or whether 
their conceptions are more biologically-based, as is their reasoning about other influential social 
categories (e.g., gender; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). I tested the prediction that at the age when 
children first become aware of their national identity as a category marker, they will  hold an 
essentialist conception of nationality, believing that it is a biologically-based, stable, and 
inherent feature of their selves. However, as they age, this tendency will decline, and they will 
instead attribute nationality to more environmentally-determined factors (Studies 1-3). Further, I 
investigated the consequences of an early essentialist conception of national identity, and 
specifically the role that essentialism plays in predicting outgroup-denigrating beliefs and 
behaviors (Studies 3 & 4). In uncovering the early manifestations and consequences of national 
identity beliefs, the present research presents an important first look at the development of 
children’s understanding of nation-state membership, and the lasting impact it may have on their 
interactions with the world.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Since its origins in post-Renaissance Europe, the nation state has held a privileged place 
both politically and psychologically, influencing the actions and attitudes of groups based on 
their national identities (Anderson, 2006). Even today, despite a trend of increasing globalization 
in nearly every aspect of modern life, nationality is a key source of personal identity and ingroup 
affiliation. For instance, 81% of Americans report being either “very proud” or “extremely 
proud” to be American (Swift, 2015), and over 88% of Americans say that being an American is 
either “very important” or “extremely important” to their identity as people (ANES, 2004). Thus, 
national identity seems to function not only as a shallow administrative means of classifying 
people but also as a powerful source of identity and meaning. In this way, national identity 
behaves similarly to other social category markers such as race, gender, and ethnicity 
(Hirschfeld, 1995; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006).  
Nationality and the extent to which one identifies with one’s national group also have 
consequences for one’s views and treatment of others. Strong national identification, for 
instance, has been linked with anti-immigrant attitudes, and with a tendency to view ethnic 
minorities as outsiders (e.g., Huynh, Devos, & Altman, 2015; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). 
Recent evidence for the influence of nationalist (i.e., the belief that one’s country is superior to 
all others) beliefs on intergroup attitudes can be found in the pro-isolationist, and at times, anti-
immigrant platforms embedded in political parties (e.g., UKIP in the United Kingdom; National 
Front in France) that have recently gained traction across the globe (“League of Nationalists”, 
2016). Perhaps most strikingly, the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States—
and his ongoing efforts to restrict entry into the U.S. for individuals of certain nationalities—
reflect a shift in popular thinking about national groups and how they should interact.   
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Given the significant influence that national identity has on people’s behavior and 
attitudes, uncovering precisely when and how people first conceptualize their national identity 
may prove important to better understanding the role of nationality in our social interactions. 
Here, I explore the developmental origins of national identity concepts; that is, I investigate how 
young children conceptualize their nationality and whether these early conceptions have 
consequences for outgroup-oriented behavior. I propose that, unlike most adults, young children 
have a biologically-based conception of nationality, which has a significant impact on how they 
view and treat members of their own as well as other national groups. Specifically, I argue that 
believing that national identity is an inherited, internal, and stable trait may lead children to 
endorse intergroup inequalities as fundamentally fair and just. 
Conceptions of national identity: What we know 
As alluded to above, national identity is a powerful category marker that influences a 
variety of social judgments. However, unlike many other delineators of social groups, national 
identity is largely determined by factors extrinsic to the individual (e.g., where one was born, 
where they live), and is to some extent malleable. For instance, immigrating to a new country 
can allow one to acquire a new national identity, and thus a new set of nationality-relevant 
attitudes and behaviors. When asked explicitly to consider the factors that are important in 
making someone an American, a vast majority of adults list qualities like having American 
citizenship or being able to speak English, reflecting the understanding that what makes someone 
a member of a specific national group is not necessarily inborn or immutable (Schildkraut, 
2007).   
The fact that nationality is determined by largely contextual or extrinsic forces sets it 
apart from other category markers, like race and gender, which are widely assumed to have some 
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biological basis. However, similarly to more biologically-determined categories, conceptions of 
nationality can be extremely powerful in terms of the beliefs and behaviors they license. The 
adult literature on the consequences of certain national identity beliefs has largely focused on 
two aspects of nationality conceptions: (1) how favorably people view their nationality and 
national group compared to others, and (2) how important people consider their nationality to 
their personal identity.   
A great deal of research on the first aspect has revealed that comparative beliefs about 
national identity have important consequences for people’s attitudes toward domestic and foreign 
groups and policies (e.g., Gangl, Torgler, & Kirchler, 2015; Livi, Leone, Falgares, & Lombardo, 
2014; Schatz et al., 1999; Worchel & Coutant, 1997). For instance, nationalism—the belief that 
one’s nation and national group is superior to all others (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Burnswik, 
Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Kosterman & Feschbach, 1989; Schatz et al., 1999)—has been 
linked with system-supporting attitudes (Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2011), authoritarianism 
(Baughn, & Yaprak, 1996), and anti-multiculturalism (Li & Brewer, 2004). Similarly, 
unquestioning support for one’s country and an intolerance of criticism (i.e., “blind patriotism”) 
predicts political disengagement and selective avoidance of anti-national group information (Livi 
et al., 2014; Schatz et al., 1999). However, a more critical but still favorable (i.e., “constructive 
patriotism”) view of one’s national group is related to more politically engaged behaviors and 
greater concern for others, regardless of national allegiance (i.e., universalism). Thus, how 
people evaluate their national group, and consequently their national identity, in relation to 
others appears to have important consequences for their behavior. 
In cases in which participants are asked to consider the personal importance of their 
national identity (and not necessarily its status compared to others), national group identification 
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is still influential, and at times can be invoked as a means of fostering prejudice (e.g., Falomir-
Pichastor & Frederic, 2013; Kunovich, 2009; Meeus, Duriez, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2010). One 
investigation of the relationship between perceived national group importance and outgroup 
attitudes, for instance, found a strong positive relationship between the importance of national 
identification (e.g., “Is it important for you to be Swiss?”) and the belief that immigrants threaten 
the collective national identity (e.g., “To what extent do immigrants constitute a threat to the 
Swiss identity?”; Falomir-Pichastor & Frederic, 2013). Further, the importance to which people 
ascribed their national identity was also found to be strongly correlated with prejudice toward 
outgroups (e.g., “These immigrants are asking too much when they demand equal rights”), 
suggesting that the extent to which people identify with their national group may influence not 
only their conceptions of outgroups, but also how they behave toward outgroup members. 
Nationality therefore represents a powerful and unique identity marker, with far-reaching 
consequences for human behavior. Given this, I explored the origins of national identity 
conceptions, in an effort to uncover precisely how nationality beliefs, and the corresponding 
intergroup attitudes, take root early in life. 
Like adults, children appear to identify strongly with their national group from a young 
age. For instance, American children as young as five are able to identify their nationality and 
recognize their country’s flag, and there is some evidence that a strong sense of national pride 
exists by age seven (Moore et al., 1985; Piaget & Weil, 1951; Weinstein, 1957). Given that even 
young children are well aware of their national identity and (similar to adults) consider 
nationality to be an important aspect of their identity (Carrington & Short, 1995; 1996), one 
might expect children to have a rather sophisticated subjective conceptualization of national 
identity. That is, similar to adults, children may understand the malleable nature of nationality, 
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and be highly sensitive to the various external, contingent factors that determine national 
identity. And in fact, older children and adolescents do express adult-like conceptions of 
nationality (Carrington & Short, 1995; 1996; Howard & Gill, 2001). For example, when queried 
about “what makes a person British,” over 80% of 11-year-old Scottish children cited “being 
born in Britain” as a deciding factor, while less than 3% mentioned race or ethnicity (Carrington 
& Short, 1995). However, very little is known about children’s concepts of national identity 
before the age of 10, and in fact, research on early category reasoning suggests that young 
children’s views on this topic may be quite different from those of adolescents and adults. 
Early essentialist conceptions of social categories 
For several decades, developmental researchers have noticed a pattern in young 
children’s reasoning about natural (e.g., dogs, lions) and social (e.g., women, Blacks) kinds. 
Beginning around age 4, children’s thinking reflects a belief that such categories are determined 
by some deep, microstructural essence, which is responsible for causing category-relevant 
properties and behaviors (e.g., Gelman, 2003). Members of the same category are thought to 
share the same essence, which reflects a stable, inherent part of their identity. This belief in 
psychological essentialism has striking consequences for children’s categorical reasoning, 
leading them to believe that individuals that share the same category essence will share 
properties and preferences (e.g., Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006), that essence-linked features are 
impervious to changes in the environment (e.g., Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009), and that 
stable internal characteristics underlie attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Gelman & Wellman, 1991; 
Newman & Keil, 2008). As a result, children view category membership as stable across time 
and delineated by strict boundaries. Given that children demonstrate essentialist reasoning about 
social categories based on race (e.g., Hirschfeld, 1995), gender (e.g., Gelman & Taylor, 2000), 
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ethnicity (e.g., Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2010) and religion 
(Chalik, Rhodes, & Leslie, 2013; Segev, Bergman, & Diesendruck, 2012), it is possible that they 
might conceptualize even the highly externally-determined category of national identity as being 
rooted in biology.   
Further support for this expectation comes from research on children’s reasoning about 
another externally-determined category marker, language (e.g., Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1997; 
Kinzler & Dautel, 2012). Like national identity, the language that one speaks is largely due to 
various environmental and contextual factors, such as the language(s) spoken by one’s parents 
and early linguistic input. However, young children’s reasoning about language instead 
resembles their essentialist conceptions of categories such as gender. For instance, when asked 
whether a young child would grow into an adult that either a) spoke the same language as the 
child, but was a member of a different race or b) spoke a different language as the child, but was 
a member of the same race, 5- and 6-year-old children reliably chose the same-language, 
different-race adult (Kinzler & Dautel, 2012). Thus, young children view language as an 
essential trait, even though it is in reality determined by one’s environment. This evidence 
provides indirect support for the prediction that children might view nationality as an 
essentialized category marker.   
In addition to serving as a framework through which people categorize natural and social 
groups, essentialism also influences their attitudes and behavior toward those groups. In adults, 
for instance, essentialism of social categories has been shown at times to have negative 
consequences, fueling the belief that those who don’t share the same essence are fundamentally 
different. There have even been instances when essentialism in adulthood has been linked with 
overt stereotyping and prejudice toward outgroups (e.g. Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Haslam, 
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Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Keller, 2005). Essentialist conceptions of social groups also appear to 
influence children’s behaviors, leading them to withhold resources from an outgroup (i.e., those 
with different essences), suggesting that essentialism may have important consequences for 
children’s status- and resource-based judgments (Rhodes, Leslie, Saunders, Dunham, & 
Cimpian, in press). However, the relationship between essentialism and overt prejudice (e.g., 
disliking, avoiding affiliation) in children is somewhat tenuous, with mixed results suggesting 
that further research is necessary to determine when essentializing a social category fosters 
prejudiced beliefs about the outgroup (Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015; Pauker, Ambady, & 
Apfelbaum, 2010; Rhodes et al., in press).  
Given the influence that essentialist reasoning has on one’s outgroup-oriented beliefs and 
behaviors, an essentialist notion of national identity may also influence children’s behaviors 
toward national outgroups, most prominently in cases when a division of resources is involved. 
Therefore, in the present research, I explored both children’s essentialist conceptions of national 
identity, as well as the consequences that such conceptions may have for their attitudes toward 
national outgroups. 
The Present Research 
 Based on the powerful role essentialist beliefs play in children’s early category reasoning, 
I formulated two central predictions that guided my investigation. In Chapter 2, I tested the 
prediction that children’s early national identity reasoning would show the hallmarks of 
essentialism. In Chapters 3 and 4, I tested whether children’s essentialism about their national 
identity influences their outgroup-oriented attitudes. 
Prediction 1: Early essentialist thinking. First, I expected that young children’s 
reasoning about national identity—both their own and others’—would show signs of 
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essentialism. That is, I predicted that young children would describe national identity as stable, 
inherent, and biologically determined. However, I also predicted that the tendency to essentialize 
national identity would decrease with age, as children become more aware of the contextual 
factors that define one’s nationality. This parallels findings in the essentialism (e.g., Gelman, 
2003) and national identity (e.g., Carrington & Short, 1995) literatures, in which older children 
essentialize social categories to a lesser degree, and attribute national identity to environmental 
factors. Therefore, I expected older children to attribute their national identity to external factors, 
such as country of residence or birthplace, more often than younger children. I tested this 
prediction in Chapter 2 in two studies, examining children’s conceptions about their own 
(American) national identity, as well as an outgroup nationality. In order to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of children’s early essentialist conceptions, I used several different 
measures of essentialist thinking, including both forced-choice and open-ended tasks.  
 Prediction 2: Consequences of essentialist thinking for intergroup attitudes and 
behaviors. In Chapters 3 and 4, I investigated the consequences of holding essentialist 
conceptions of national identity on two outgroup-oriented behaviors: justification of intergroup 
inequalities, and overt prejudice . Although I expected a significant decline in children’s 
essentialism of national identity over time, I also predicted that essentializing national identity 
would have important consequences for behavior in children of all ages, given its influential role 
in outgroup-oriented behavior in both adults and children (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Rhodes 
et al., in press). Thus, my second central prediction was that essentialism of national identity 
would be related to behaviors that emphasize the divisions between national groups, as 
essentialist reasoning fosters the belief that those of different nationalities are fundamentally 
different people. As prior work has demonstrated that children show a strong tendency to justify 
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group-based disparities based on presumed inherent features of the groups involved (Hussak & 
Cimpian, 2015), I predicted that children who believed that national groups differed on 
fundamental inherent properties (an essence) would rationalize existing inequalities. More direct 
support for this prediction is also found in previous work that suggests that essentialist 
conceptions lead children to skew intergroup resource distributions in their favor (Rhodes et al., 
in press). I tested this prediction in Chapter 3 by measuring both children’s ingroup nationality 
essentialism and their tendency to believe that intergroup disparities are fair and just.  
I also tested, but had less definitive expectations about, the role of an essentialist 
conception of national identity on prejudiced attitudes toward other national groups. While I 
expected children to demonstrate a robust ingroup preference (e.g., Brewer, 1999; Dunham, 
Baron, & Carey, 2011), I did not make strong predictions about whether this preference would be 
influenced by children’s essentialist beliefs. One primary reason for this is the fact that the US 
consistently ranks as one of the most patriotic and nationalistic countries in the world, with high 
endorsement of statements like “America is the greatest country in the world” (Doré, 2015; Hess 
& Torney, 1976; Tyson, 2014). Given that such sentiments are embedded within poems and 
songs (e.g., the Pledge of Allegiance, the Star-Spangled Banner) that most children are exposed 
to on a daily basis, I expected that pro-American attitudes would be demonstrated by nearly all 
children, and thus not necessarily be strongly related to their essentialist conceptions. This 
expectation is further supported by the fact that the developmental evidence for a link between 
essentialism and prejudice is thus far mixed (Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015; Pauker, Ambady, 
& Apfelbaum, 2010; Rhodes et al., in press).  
Proposed moderators and mechanisms of the relationship between essentialism and 
outgroup attitudes. Finally, in Chapter 4, I explored the conditions under which essentialism 
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may lead to certain outgroup attitudes—specifically, the rationalization of intergroup 
inequalities. I tested whether the relationship between essentialist thinking and support for such 
inequalities is present both when the ingroup (here, Americans) is advantaged and when it is 
disadvantaged. I expected that the relationship between essentialism and support for resource-
based disparities would vary depending on the relative status of the ingroup as well as children’s 
age, as they may experience differing motivations (e.g., to favor the ingroup vs. to support the 
status quo) across development. 
I also explored the mechanisms that may underlie the hypothesized relationship between 
essentialism of national identity and support for resource-based intergroup inequalities. More 
specifically, I tested whether adopting an essentialist conception of national identity leads 
children to believe that a) intergroup contact is highly unlikely and b) their national identity is an 
unchangeable feature of their selves. I also tested whether holding such beliefs predicted 
heightened support for intergroup inequalities.  
With respect to the first possible mechanism, one trademark of essentialist thinking is that 
it highlights the discreteness of category boundaries (e.g., Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Gelman, 
2003; Rhodes et al., in press; Taylor et al., 2009; Williams & Eberhardt, 2009). In the case of 
national groups (who largely live in separate parts of the world), an essentialist conception may 
thus lead children to believe that they are unlikely to ever encounter a member of a national 
outgroup. Thus, it may be easier for them to endorse intergroup inequalities if they believe that 
they will never personally see their effects. Alternatively, essentialism—and more specifically, 
beliefs about stability—may contribute to the notion that one’s national identity is unchangeable 
(e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Gelman, 2003; Gelman, Ware, & Kleinberg, 2010; Keller, 2005). 
Therefore, in cases when one’s ingroup is advantaged, children who hold an essentialist 
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conception of national identity may be especially likely to endorse intergroup inequalities, as 
they’ll view their relatively high-status national identity as permanent.  
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CHAPTER 2: EARLY ESSENTIALIST CONCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
 In Chapter 2, I investigated children’s early concepts of their national identity in two 
studies. In both, I tested whether children have an essentialist conception of national identity, 
believing that it is an inherent, stable, and inherited feature. In Study 1, I explored children’s 
conceptions of their own (i.e., American) national identity, and in Study 2 I compared children’s 
reasoning about American national identity with their reasoning about a familiar outgroup 
national identity (namely, Canadian). From this comparison, I was able to draw conclusions 
about whether children’s concepts of nationality differ depending on whether the national group 
in question is one to which they belong. In both studies, I recruited children between the ages of 
5 and 8, in order to explore a previously understudied period of development during which 
children can identify their nationality but may not yet possess adult-like reasoning regarding its 
origins and characteristics. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. I recruited 70 five- to eight-year-old children (35 males, 35 females; Mage = 
7.12 years, SD = 1.26). Participants were recruited from a small Midwestern city (as were the 
participants in Studies 2, 3, and 4) and were tested either in a university lab (n = 29) or in a quiet 
room at their school (n = 41). I sampled 5- to 8-year-olds in Studies 1-3 (and 5- to -12-year-olds 
in Study 4) in order to cover a relatively broad period of development and thus provide an 
adequate test of the prediction of decreases in essentialism with age. Additionally, prior research 
has demonstrated that five is the earliest age at which children reliably identify their own 
nationality and national symbols, a skill that is critical in my studies (Piaget & Weil, 1951; 
Weinstein, 1957). Voluntary demographic information was provided by a subset of the 
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participants’ families (n = 39), and reflected that a majority (>80%) were European American, 
and came from homes in which the primary caregiver had at least a Bachelor’s degree (79%) and 
a median income between $80,000- $99,999.1 
Materials. To test whether children essentialize their national identity, I administered a 
combination of forced-choice and open-ended measures adapted from previous developmental 
studies of essentialist reasoning, described below. 
Forced-Choice Measures. I asked questions pertaining to four previously established 
components of essentialism (e.g., Gelman, 2003). To assess children’s belief in the stability of 
their national identity, I introduced them to a young child who was identified as an American. I 
then asked children whether that child a) had always been an American and b) would always be 
an American (adapted from Gelman & Heyman, 1999). Children who answered affirmatively to 
the second question were then asked whether the American child would remain an American if 
they moved to another country “far far away”. Finally, all children were asked whether the child 
would be an American even if they didn’t want to be an American anymore. For the first and last 
question, children’s responses were assigned either a 1 (“yes” answers) or a 0 (“no” answers ). 
For the second question, children who said that the child would not always be an American were 
given the score of 0; those who said that the child would always be an American, but not if they 
moved to a country far away were given a score of .5; those that answered “yes” to both 
questions (that the child would always be an American, even if they moved “far far away”) were 
given a score of 1. Scores were averaged to create a composite stability score (α = .41). 
In order to assess whether children believed that national identity was heritable, I used a 
classic adoption task from Gelman and Wellman (1991). I introduced children to two couples, an 
                                                             
1
 When included in the multilevel models in Studies 1-4, neither parental education nor family income were 
significant predictors of children’s essentialist beliefs or outgroup attitudes  
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American couple and an Andorran couple. In order to distinguish between the two, children were 
shown pictures of each couple, with the corresponding flag in the background. Assignment of 
nationality to each couple was counterbalanced across participants. I then told children that the 
American couple had a baby, but right after the baby was born, it went to live with the Andorran 
couple, with whom it grew up. After being informed that the baby grew up never seeing its birth 
parents, or any Americans ever again, children were asked three questions about what the baby 
would be like when it grew up. Specifically, children were asked whether the (former) baby 
would be an American or an Andorran, whether it would speak English or the Andorran 
language, and whether it would like the same foods as the American couple or as the Andorran 
couple. Question order was randomized. Essentialist responses (i.e., those that reflected the 
belief that the adopted baby would retain American characteristics) were assigned a value of 1, 
while non-essentialist responses were assigned a value of 0. Averages of these values were taken 
to construct a heritability composite score (α = .25). 
To test whether children believed that national identity had a biological nature (i.e., is 
manifested in one’s biology), I adapted a task that assessed children’s beliefs about the 
physicality of category membership (Gelman, 2003; Newman & Keil, 2008). Children were 
shown a picture of two identical twins and were told that only one of the two was an American, 
while the other was not an American. Children were then presented with five “ideas” in random 
order for how they could determine which individual in the picture was an American. Three of 
the ideas involved examining the biology of the two people in the photo (e.g., “Do you think we 
could tell who’s an American by looking at their blood/bones/brains?”). For each question, 
children received a score of 1 if they answered “yes,” and a score of 0 if they answered “no.” 
Two additional questions, which were designed to elicit widespread agreement (e.g., “Do you 
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think we could tell who’s an American by talking to the girls, and asking them questions?”) and 
disagreement (e.g., “Do you think we could tell who’s an American by finding out how old the 
girls are?”), were also asked to ensure that children were not simply answering in a uniform 
manner (e.g., always answering “yes”). As expected, levels of agreement were vastly different 
for these two questions (99% vs. 20% agreement for the “asking questions” and “age” questions, 
respectively). The values for the three main biology questions were averaged to create a 
biological nature composite score (α = .62). 
The final forced-choice measure assessed beliefs about the inductive potential of national 
identity—that is, the extent to which children believe that information about national identity 
licenses inductive inferences (Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Markman, 1987). Specifically, this task 
pitted national identity against other inductively powerful and informative category markers 
(namely, race and gender) to test which category membership children found to be most 
inductively rich. In this task, adapted from Diesendruck and haLevi (2006), children were 
introduced to three people: a target character and two test characters. The test characters were 
always introduced first and were labeled as either American or belonging to a different national 
group (e.g., South African). To further highlight the characters’ national identity, all characters 
were shown in photographs holding their respective countries’ flags. In the two critical trials, the 
test characters were described as having differing preferences (e.g., “This is Megan. She’s an 
American. Megan likes to play Gorp at recess. This is Mark. He’s an Estonian. Mark likes to 
play Quid at recess.”). In addition to having different preferences, the test characters also 
differed on some other social category marker (race or gender). After being introduced to the test 
characters, children were shown the target character, who was always shown with an American 
flag, and thus shared the national identity of one of the test characters (i.e., American). The 
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American target character also shared the social category membership of the non-American test 
character (race or gender). For example, if the test characters were an American girl and an 
Estonian boy, the target character would be an American boy. Children were asked to guess 
whether the target character would share the preference of the same-nationality test character or 
the same-gender/race test character (e.g., “This is Aaron. Do you think Aaron likes to play Gorp 
at recess, like Megan, or does he like to play Quid at recess, like Mark?”). The order in which the 
test characters were mentioned in each test question was counterbalanced.  
As race and gender have been found to be inductively rich categories for young children 
(e.g., Gelman & Taylor, 2000; Hirschfeld, 1995), they were used as foils on the two critical test 
trials. Thus, if children believed that Americans would share preferences with other Americans, 
even when they differed in race or gender, it would suggest that they believed that national 
identity licenses important inductive inferences, perhaps even beyond those licensed by other 
salient category markers.  
In addition to the two critical trials, which asked about preferences, two control trials 
were also included. In these control trials, children were asked to make inductive inferences 
about properties that one would not expect to differ by nationality (e.g., handedness, the gender 
of one’s sibling). Just as in the critical trials, children judged whether the target would share a 
property with a same-nationality, different-gender/race individual, or with a different-nationality, 
same-gender/race individual. However, I expected children to show a weaker tendency to choose 
the American test character in the control trials than in the critical trials, which they did (63% 
chose the same-nationality child on the control questions vs. 78% on the critical trials, t(69) = 
2.87, p = .005).  
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For the two critical trials, children received a score of 1 when they chose the American 
test character (i.e., they generalized the property from the American test character to the 
American target character), and a score of 0 when they chose the non-American test character. 
Scores on the critical trials were averaged to create an inductive potential composite (α = .11). 
Open Ended Measures. To obtain a more comprehensive picture of children’s concepts 
of national identity, I also included three open-ended measures that assessed (1) children’s 
explanations for the origins of popular national conventions, (2) the subjective meaning children 
assign to national identity, and (3) children’s understanding of the process by which one acquires 
a certain national identity.  
First, because national identity is often made salient in the context of conventions and 
national traditions, I tested whether children explained popular national traditions in essentialist 
ways—for example, if they believed that Americans eat a lot of apple pie because of some 
inherent, important features of Americans (as opposed to historical or conventional practices). 
Children were asked three questions in random order about American traditions (eating apple 
pie, going to baseball games, watching fireworks shows). Answers that explained the tradition as 
arising from inherent or internal features were given a score of 1 (e.g., “[Americans watch 
fireworks] because they’re American and they like watching fireworks shows”). Answers that 
attributed the tradition to more arbitrary (historical or environmental) circumstances were given a 
score of 0 (e.g., “[Americans eat apple pie] because maybe people founded this [tradition] a long 
time ago when the pilgrims were here and we like to eat it and add on to the tradition”). All 
responses were coded by the author as well as a second, hypothesis-blind coder. Both coders 
were blind to participants’ age. Inter-rater agreement was 87%, and disagreements were resolved 
  
18 
 
via discussion. Children’s scores were averaged across the three questions to form a composite 
conventions score. (α = .30) 
Second, to more directly assess children’s subjective understanding of national identity as 
a category marker, I asked them to explain what it “means to be an American” (henceforth, 
meaning). Children’s responses that reflected an essentialist conception of national identity—that 
is, those that explained nationality in terms of an individual trait (e.g., “to be nice”), behavior 
(e.g., “to speak English”), or internal state (e.g., “it’s just how you feel in your body”)—were 
given a score of 1 (see Table 1 for more examples). These types of responses suggest that 
children conceptualize national identity as an inherent feature or “essence” that resides within an 
individual. Children’s responses that reflected a more extrinsic understanding of national 
identity, mentioning historical (e.g., “you were born in America and have parents who were born 
in America”) or environmental (e.g., “you live in America”) influences, were given a score of 0 
(inter-rater agreement = 90%).  
As a final open-ended measure of children’s conceptions of national identity, I asked 
them to explain how a person “becomes an American” (henceforth, acquisition). This question 
allowed me to further assess whether children believed that national identity could be acquired, 
or whether it was some inherent, essential feature that one either does or does not possess from 
birth. Children’s responses that attributed nationality to some inherent trait or feature (e.g., 
“[You become an American] when you are born and you talk English”) were given a score of 1, 
while children’s responses that described becoming an American as a process determined by 
environmental or extrinsic forces (e.g., “You have to travel to America”) were given a score of 0 
(inter-rater agreement = 82%). 
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Procedure. All children completed all of the measures in a single session. The order of 
the measures (aside from the final two questions, which always came at the end of the study to 
avoid contaminating the other measures) was counterbalanced across participants.  
Results 
 Analytic Strategy. Composite essentialism scores differed greatly from task to task 
(from .21 to .78, see Table 2 for all means and SDs; α = −.04). However, all were significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that children’s early national identity conceptions contain traces 
of essentialist thinking. The high degree of variability across tasks however highlights the fact 
that early conceptions of national identity are multi-faceted and differ from child to child. This 
finding is in line with others in the literature. Early in childhood, children’s performance on 
measures of essentialism is not uniform and does not correlate consistently across measures 
(Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007).2 Given the significant variability in the essentialism 
composites and the fact that they did not appear to correlate strongly with one another (α = −.04), 
I included all seven measures of essentialism (four forced-choice and three open-ended) as 
separate dependent variables in the multilevel models we used to analyze these data. This also 
allowed me to observe whether the various components of essentialist thought differ in their 
developmental trajectories. 
                                                             
2 It is important to note that the high degree of variability in children’s endorsement of the components of 
essentialism does not necessarily reflect a lack of understanding or definitive beliefs about the nature of national 
identity. A closer look at the measures used highlights the fact that the theoretical midpoint is no t the same for all 
measures, and variability in children’s endorsement is in fact to be expected. For example, a child with a .33 
biological nature composite would have answered that one’s American identity can be detected in one of three 
internal locations (brain, bones, or blood). Believing that one’s social category membership is evident in their 
biology is a hallmark of essentialist thought, and so any deviation from 0 (i.e., answering “no” to all three biological 
nature questions) on the biological nature composite would indicate a highly essentialist conception of national 
identity. In contrast, a .33 heritability composite score would reflect the belief that an American child adopted by 
non-American parents would share more traits (e.g., language spoken, national identity) with their adopted than their 
biological parents, suggesting that national identity, and its associated traits is influenced more by experience than 
genealogy. Thus, one would characterize this as a fairly weak essentialist conception.  
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 To get a first look at the relationship between essentialism and age, I conducted bivariate 
correlations between children’s ages and their endorsement of the seven measures of 
essentialism. As my first main prediction was that children’s tendency to essentialize national 
identity would decrease with age, I then conducted a linear mixed-effects multilevel regression. 
Children’s composite scores on each of the seven essentialism items served as the dependent 
variables. Age, six indicator variables (with stability omitted) specifying essentialism task (e.g., 
biological, inductive potential), and the interactions between age and the six indicator variables 
served as the independent variables. The model included random intercepts for subjects.  
 Findings.  Five of the seven essentialism measures were negatively correlated with age, 
providing initial evidence that children’s tendency to essentialize national identity decreases 
across childhood (rs = .06 [stability], −.20 [heritability], −.40 [biological nature], .004 [inductive 
potential], −.17 [conventions], −.09 [meaning], −.22 [acquisition]; see Table 3 for full correlation 
matrix).  
The results of the mixed-effects linear regression revealed that the main predicted 
negative relationship between age and essentialism was significant, b = −.04 [−.07, −.02], p < 
.001 (see Figure 1). This result suggests that, across tasks, younger children were more likely to 
hold an essentialist conception of national identity than were older children. However, this 
relationship was not uniform across tasks, suggesting that different components of children’s 
conceptions of national identity may develop at different rates (see Table 4 for full regression 
results). In particular, the significant Age × Biological Nature interaction (b = −.13 [−.21, −.04], 
p = .005) indicates that there is a significantly steeper decline in children’s beliefs in a biological 
component of nationality over time than there is for their beliefs about the stability of national 
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identity.3 The fact that all of the other interaction terms were negative as well suggests that the 
other components of essentialism also declined more sharply across childhood than did stability; 
however, this difference in slope with age only reached significance for Biological Nature, as 
discussed above. 
Conclusion. The results of Study 1 provide initial evidence for the predicted age-related 
decline in children’s tendency to essentialize their American national identity. In Study 2, I 
explore whether this relationship is unique to children’s reasoning about their own national 
identity, or whether it applies to their understanding of national identity more broadly. To answer 
this question, I compared children’s essentialism of American national identity to their 
essentialism of Canadian national identity, a familiar (yet distinct) identity to most Americans. 
 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 70 five- to eight-year-old children (35 males, 35 females; 
Mage = 6.94 years, SD = 1.19) who were tested either in a university lab (n = 41) or in a quiet 
room at their school (n = 29). One additional child was tested but excluded from the final sample 
for refusing to complete the study. Demographic information was provided by 39 families. The 
demographic characteristics of the participants in Study 2 were largely similar to Study 1; that is, 
participants were mostly European American (72%) and came from households in which the 
primary caregiver held at least a Bachelor’s degree (92%), with a median household income 
between $100,000-$119,000. 
                                                             
3
 When the same model is run with biological nature as the omitted variable, all of the Task x Age interaction terms 
are positive (stability [b = .13, p = .005] and inductive potential [b =.11, p = .01] being the only significant terms), 
indicating that children’s beliefs about the biological nature of national identity experience the sharpest decline 
across childhood. 
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Materials and Procedure. As my goal in Study 2 was to measure children’s essentialism 
of both their own and an outgroup national identity, I used a subset of items from Study 1 to keep 
the study session at a manageable length. I used the stability, heritability, and biological nature 
forced choice measures from Study 1. For each measure, the procedure was identical for Study 1, 
and children completed each measure twice, once with American national identity being the 
target, and once with Canadian national identity being the target (e.g., in the heritability task, the 
birth parents were a Canadian couple, and the participant was asked whether the baby would be a 
Canadian or an Andorran when it grew up). The essentialism measures were blocked by 
nationality and randomized within block. Additionally, the order of the nationality blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants.  
In order to ensure that children were familiar with Canadians as a national outgroup, at 
the end of the study they were asked several questions, including identifying the Canadian flag, 
providing the demonym for “people from Canada,” and locating Canada on a map. All children 
correctly answered at least one of these questions (overall correct = 60%). 
Results 
Findings. As in Study 1, while there was variability in children’s scores on the 
essentialism measures (α = .59; see Table 2 for all means), there were also strong signs of early 
essentialist thinking (i.e., children’s scores on all measures were significantly higher than zero) . 
A majority of essentialism measures were also negatively correlated with children’s age (rs = .26 
[American stability], −.19 [American heritability], −.30 [American biological nature], .05 
[Canadian stability], −.34 [Canadian heritability], −.32 [Canadian biological nature]; see Table 5 
for full correlation matrix).  
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Next, I conducted a mixed-effects linear regression predicting essentialism on the basis of 
Age, Task (two indicator variables; Stability omitted), Target Nationality (American or 
Canadian), and Age × Task, Nationality × Task, and Age × Nationality as interaction terms. 
Most notably, there was no overall difference in essentialist reasoning about American vs. 
Canadian targets, b = −.02 [−.07, .04], p = .58. As in Study 1, essentialism of national identity 
declined with age, b = −.03 [−.07, .001], p = .06; however, this age-related decrease was steeper 
when children considered Canadian targets vs. American targets, b = −.06 [−.11, −.02], p = .008.  
Similar to Study 1, there was considerable variability between tasks in terms of their 
relationship with age (see Table 6 for full regression results). Both heritability (b = −.08 [−.14, 
−.03], p = .004) and biological nature (b = −.13 [−.18, −.07], p < .001) showed significantly 
steeper age-related decreases than did stability, suggesting that children’s endorsement of  
biological and heritable components of national identity decline more sharply across childhood 
than does their tendency to endorse the stability of national identity.4  
Discussion 
The results from Study 2 suggest that children’s early conceptualizations of national 
identity are broadly similar when considering their own vs. an outgroup’s. Thus far, the evidence 
from Studies 1 and 2 suggests that young children hold an essentialist view of national identity, 
believing that it is an inherited, stable, and inherent characteristic, no matter whether they are 
considering their own nationality or others’. With development, children’s concepts of national 
identity become less essentialist, and this effect may be more pronounced when considering 
outgroup identities (see the General Discussion for speculation as to why this may be the case). 
This general tendency to become less essentialist with age parallels previous findings, which 
                                                             
4
 Again, running the regression model with biological nature as the omitted variable reveals positive Age x Task 
interaction terms for stability (b = 13, p < .001) and heritability (b = .05, p = .10), demonstrating that children’s 
beliefs about the biological nature of national identity experience the sharpest decline across development. 
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suggest that as children age, they refer to more environmental factors rather than to inborn or 
inherent features as being influential in determining their national identity (Carrington & Short, 
1995; 1996).  
While not directly tested here, there are a number of potential reasons for this age-related 
decline in essentialist thinking. Perhaps most obviously, older children may have more 
knowledge about the civic concept of citizenship (e.g., that it can be conferred based solely on 
birthplace), and thus they may be less likely to attribute national identity to biological or inherent 
features. Alternatively, older children may rely on more extrinsic (i.e., less essentialist) 
information when considering what comprises national identity because such information is 
more accessible, due in part to greater cognitive abilities and improved cognitive control 
(Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014). While early conceptions of national identity may focus on internal 
essentialist traits (as that information has been demonstrated to be highly accessible in memory; 
Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014), as children’s cognitive capacities 
expand, they may be more likely to instead rely on more relationally-complex extrinsic 
information to inform their understanding of national identity. Future work that directly 
investigates the cause(s) of the age-related decline in essentialist thinking would contribute to a 
richer understanding of nationality conceptions across development. 
The results so far leave open the question of whether an essentialist conception of 
national identity relates to children’s attitudes and behaviors towards outgroups, as adults’ 
essentialism of social groups has been found to do (Bastian & Haslam 2006; Haslam, Rothschild, 
& Ernst, 2002; Keller, 2005). If essentializing national identity contributes to the development of 
prejudiced or xenophobic attitudes, then uncovering the origins of this relationship early in 
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development has far-reaching implications. I go on to investigate the consequences of essentialist 
reasoning about national identity in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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CHAPTER 3: RELATION OF ESSENTIALISM TO CHILDREN’S ATTITUDES 
TOWARD OUTGROUPS 
 
In Chapter 3, I explored the relationship between essentialism of national identity and 
intergroup attitudes. Specifically, based on recent findings that essentialism of a social group 
leads children to withhold material resources from an outgroup (Rhodes et al., in press), I 
predicted that children who essentialize their national identity will be more likely to endorse and 
justify advantageous intergroup inequalities than children who do not essentialize their national 
identity. I also tested whether essentialism of national identity is linked with overt prejudice—a 
relationship for which support in the developmental literature has been mixed (e.g., Diesendruck 
& Menahem, 2015; Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2010; Rhodes et al., in press). 
Study 3 
Method 
 Participants. Participants in Study 3 were 72 five- to eight-year-old children (36 males, 
36 females; Mage = 6.93 years, SD = 1.37) who were tested either in a university lab (n = 32) or 
in a quiet room at their school (n = 40). Two additional children were tested but excluded from 
the final sample because they refused to complete the study. Demographic information was 
provided by 59 participating families. A majority of participants (79%) were European American 
and came from homes in which the primary caregiver earned at least a Bachelor’s degree (83%). 
The median household income was in the range from $80,000 to $99,000. 
 Materials. In order to measure the behavioral correlates of children’s essentialism of 
national identity, in Study 3 I administered four measures of essentialism and two measures of 
attitudes toward national outgroups. 
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 Essentialism measures. The stability, heritability, biological nature, and inductive 
potential measures were administered as in Study 1. Measure order was randomized, and 
participants always made judgments about American targets. 
 Outgroup prejudice measure. In order to test whether children disproportionately viewed 
members of their national ingroup more positively than members of a national outgroup, I 
administered a modified version of the Preschool Racial Attitudes Measure II (PRAM; Williams, 
Best, & Boswell, 1975). The PRAM II is a well-validated measure of children’s early prejudice 
that correlates with behavioral measures such as playmate preferences and doll choice (Mabe & 
Williams, 1975; Nagata, 1985). Children’s scores on the PRAM II have also been found to be 
related to their performance on prejudice tasks that do not require a forced-choice (i.e., ingroup 
vs. outgroup) decision, implying that their responses don’t simply reflect an ingroup preference, 
but also tap into outgroup-oriented prejudice (e.g., Doyle & Aboud, 1995).  
In this task, children are shown two pictures, one of a child from their ingroup and one 
from a child from an outgroup. Children are then provided with either a positive or negative trait 
and asked to choose which child has that trait (e.g., “One of these two children is selfish. They 
don’t share their toys with others. Which one of these two is selfish?”; see Supplemental 
Materials for full script). Altogether, children made judgments about 12 negative and 12 positive 
traits.  
Since we were interested in children’s attitudes regarding national identity (rather than 
race, as in the original measure), we varied whether the children in the pictures were American 
or non-American by showing a flag in the background of each picture. All of the children in the 
pictures were of the same race and gender-matched with the participant (i.e., male participants 
only saw pictures of boys). Nationality assignment of the children in the pictures was 
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counterbalanced across participants. Picture placement was also random for each question; 
across participants, the American child appeared to the right vs. the left of the non-American 
child equally often.  
For the 12 positive traits, children received a score of 1 if they chose the picture of the 
American child, and a score of 0 if they chose the picture of the non-American child. For the 12 
negative traits, they received a 1 if they chose the non-American child, and a 0 if they chose the 
American child.  Children’s scores were averaged to create a prejudice composite. 
 Rationalization of inequality measure. In addition to measuring children’s differential 
assignment of positive and negative traits to ingroup and outgroup members, I also examined the 
extent to which they rationalized inequalities between the ingroup and outgroup, based on 
previous findings that children withhold resources from an essentialized outgroup (Rhodes et al., 
in press).  
Here, I was interested in whether children believe that inequalities between ingroup (i.e., 
Americans) and outgroup (i.e., non-Americans) members are fair and acceptable. I told children 
two stories in which Americans were portrayed as having an economic advantage over a novel 
non-American group (e.g., “There are lots of things that are the same about Americans and 
Daxians. They go grocery shopping, they like pancakes, and they both like to watch sports. But, 
there’s one thing that’s different about Americans and Daxians. Americans tend to have a lot 
more money than Daxians”; adapted from Hussak & Cimpian, 2015; see Supplemental Materials 
for full vignettes). In order to facilitate children’s understanding, we used pictures of two flags 
(an American flag and a non-American flag) while telling the story.  
After each story, children were asked three questions in random order: whether they 
thought it was fair that Americans had an advantage, whether they thought the inequality was 
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OK, and whether Americans deserved their advantage. For the questions that asked about 
whether the disparity was fair and OK, I asked children to elaborate on their initial “yes/no” 
responses by providing them with three additional choices (“really [not] fair/OK”, “[not] 
fair/OK”, “sort of [not] fair/OK”). Thus, children’s answers could ultimately be scored on a 6-pt 
scale (“really not fair/OK” to “really fair/OK). The deservingness measure was dichotomous 
(“yes” vs. “no”). Children’s responses across the two stories were standardized and averaged into 
a composite inequality rationalization score (α = .65). 
 Procedure. Both outgroup attitudes measures were placed in a single block (and their 
within-block order was randomized). Essentialism measures were also blocked, and both blocks 
were randomly presented to children. Block order was counterbalanced across children. 
Results and Discussion 
Essentialism of national identity over age. Children’s responses on the essentialism 
tasks again differed across tasks (task means ranged from .24 to .76; see Table 3 for full list of 
means) and, for the most part, were negatively correlated with age (rs = .04 [stability], −.38 
[heritability], −.13 [biological nature], −.23 [inductive potential]; see Table 7 for full correlation 
matrix). I then conducted a mixed-effects linear regression, predicting children’s composite 
essentialism on the basis of Age, Task (three indicator variables with stability omitted), and an 
Age × Task interaction, allowing subjects’ intercepts to vary randomly. Replicating the results 
from Studies 1 and 2, children’s tendency to essentialize national identity decreased with age, b 
= −.05 [−.08, −.02], p = .001 (see Table 8; Figure 3). Moreover, as in the previous two studies, 
there was variability in the strength of this relationship, depending on task. The Task × Age 
interaction terms were negative for heritability, biological nature, and inductive potential, 
suggesting that children’s endorsement of these essentialist components declined more sharply 
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across development than did their endorsement of stability; however, only the heritability 
interaction term reached significance (b = −.13 [−.22, −.04], p = .003).5 
Relation between essentialism and outgroup attitudes. I first examined the raw 
correlations between children’s responses on the essentialism tasks and their endorsement of (1) 
prejudiced and (2) inequality-rationalizing beliefs.  
Children did demonstrate prejudice, assigning significantly more positive traits to 
Americans and significantly more negative traits to non-Americans than would be predicted by 
chance (Ms = 0.58 and 0.64, respectively; ps ≤ .001 vs. chance). However, the tendency to 
derogate the national outgroup (i.e., the extent to which children assigned positive traits to 
Americans and negative traits to non-Americans) was not significantly correlated with any of the 
measures of essentialism (rs range: −.13 to .12; see Table 7). Thus, believing that their national 
identity was an inherent, stable, and biological part of them was not related to children’s 
tendency to attribute more negativity to non-Americans and positivity to other Americans. Given 
that Americans tend to be a highly patriotic and nationalistic group (Doré, 2015; Hess & Torney, 
1976; Tyson, 2014), and that most children are exposed to pro-American traditions (e.g., the 
Pledge of Allegiance) on a daily basis, the lack of correlation with essentialist beliefs is not 
surprising. Children’s prejudice was also not correlated with age (r = .05), suggesting that the 
tendency to hold prejudiced beliefs toward national outgroups is a developmentally stable one, 
perhaps reflecting a more general pro-American mindset.  
As a group, children also showed some (weak) signs of rationalizing the intergroup 
inequalities presented (MOK = 2.47, MFair = 1.73 [both out of 5], MDeserve = .50 [out of 1]; means 
                                                             
5
 Designating heritability as the omitted variable in the model revealed positive Age x Task interaction terms for the 
other three variables; however, only stability (b = .11, p = .02) reached significance, suggesting that while the 
developmental trajectory of heritability beliefs did not differ from those of biological nature or inductive potential 
beliefs, it was significantly different than that of stability beliefs. 
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comparable to Hussak & Cimpian, 2015). Unlike their prejudice, children’s rationalization of 
inequalities between ingroup and outgroup nationalities was positively, and in some cases 
significantly, related to individual differences in their essentialist beliefs about national identity 
(rs = .25 [with stability], .24 [with heritability], ps = .03 and .04, respectively; see Table 7 for 
full results). To test whether these relationships hold when adjusting for participants’ age, and to 
also see whether any of the individual essentialism components have unique predictive power, I 
conducted a linear regression predicting children’s inequality rationalization on the basis of their 
four essentialism scores and their ages. Stability remained a significant predictor in this model (β 
= .31 [.26, 1.73], p = .009; see Table 9 for full regression results), suggesting that the extent to 
which children essentialize their national identity—and specifically, the extent to which they 
believe it is a stable, immutable feature of their identity—predicts their belief that inequalities 
between their national ingroup and outgroup members are fair and deserved, above and beyond 
their age. Heritability was still positively related with children’s inequality rationalization; 
however, it did not reach significance, β = .22 [−.06, 1.07], p = .08. 
Conclusion. The findings from Study 3 provide the first evidence that early essentialist 
conceptions of national identity are related to children’s treatment of national outgroups. 
However, these findings are correlational in nature, and thus it remains unclear whether 
essentializing one’s national identity causally influences beliefs and behaviors toward outgroup 
members. While others (e.g., Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015; Rhodes et al, in press) have found 
essentialism of a social group to be causally implicated in various attitudes and behaviors, further 
research is necessary to establish the same relationship in the domain of national identity. Thus, 
in Chapter 4, I developed a study to test whether there is a causal relationship between 
essentialism of national identity and support for inequalities between nations. 
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CHAPTER 4: INVESTIGATING THE CAUSAL NATURE AND MECHANISMS 
UNDERLYING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ESSENTIALISM OF NATIONAL 
IDENTITY AND SUPPORT FOR INEQUALITY 
 
The study described in this chapter had three goals. First, it investigated whether the 
relationship between essentialism of national identity and support for inequalities between 
national groups is causal. Second, it explored whether the relationship between essentialism and 
inequality support is influenced by the relative status of one’s ingroup. Finally, it explored the 
mechanisms that may underlie this potential causal relationship. 
In order to address the first two goals, I tested predictions set forth by two prominent 
theories of intergroup relations, system justification theory (SJT) and social identity theory (SIT). 
SJT and SIT make diverging predictions, spelled out below, about how individuals will react to 
instances of intergroup inequality, which are informative for understanding children’s attitudes 
towards national group-based disparities in the present study.  
According to system justification theory (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 
2002; Kay et al., 2009), people possess a fundamental motive to view their systems as fair and 
legitimate. As a result, when confronted with instances of inequality, people are more likely to 
rationalize (rather than reject) the status quo, even when their own group is disadvantaged (e.g., 
Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Kay & Jost, 2003). In fact, some have argued that low-
status individuals may demonstrate greater support for the system than their high-status 
counterparts, as a means of reducing the uncertainty or anxiety they feel about their (largely 
unfavorable) positions (Jost et al., 2003; Kay & Jost, 2003; Laurin, Fitzsimons & Kay, 2011; but 
see Brandt, 2013). If the drive to support the status quo is present early on in life, then according 
to SJT, children in the present study should rationalize the inequalities, regardless of the relative 
status of the ingroup, and potentially more so when the ingroup is disadvantaged. An SJT 
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account might also predict that inequality rationalization would be most prominent for those who 
hold an essentialist conception of national identity, as essentializing national identity may lead 
children to believe that the group-based hierarchies are rooted in stable and legitimate group 
differences, thus reinforcing the notion that the system is fair (e.g., Laurin, Gaucher, & Kay, 
2013; Laurin, Kay, & Fitzsimons, 2012; see Figure 4 for a graphical representation of the 
predictions).  
Importantly, however, system justification motives may not be influential at all stages of 
development. Specifically, given that they are hypothesized as functioning to “reduce anxiety, 
guilt, dissonance, discomfort, and uncertainty” that individuals may feel when contemplating 
their place in a larger society, it is possible that as children age and identify more strongly as 
members of their given societies, they may be more susceptible to these system justifying 
motives (Jost & Hunyady, 2002, p. 114; see also Hussak & Cimpian, 2015). Thus, system 
justification motives may play a weaker role in young children’s (e.g., 5-year-olds) reasoning. 
Instead, younger children (e.g., 5- to 8-year-olds), who perhaps identify less strongly with their 
given societies (and thus have yet to experience strong system justification motivations), might 
base their support for the intergroup inequalities more on ingroup favoritism motives, which 
have been documented even in infants (e.g., Baillargeon, Setoh, Sloane, Jin, & Bian, 2014; 
Brewer, 1999; Mahajan, & Wynn, 2012). Younger children’s attitudes then may be better 
predicted by an account that prioritizes ingroup favoritism motives, namely, social identity 
theory. 
According to social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; 1986), the groups to 
which one belongs are instrumental in constructing his/her self-concept. In order to maintain a 
positive self-concept, people show preferences for and ascribe positive attributes to their ingroup 
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(i.e., ingroup bias), even in instances when their group disadvantaged (e.g., Lalonde, 2002). 
Thus, SIT would predict that in general, children would support intergroup inequalities when the 
disparities benefit the ingroup (i.e., Americans = high-status), and would react against 
inequalities that derogate the ingroup (i.e., Americans = low-status). However, according to SIT, 
the perceived stability and legitimacy of an inequality is also thought to be influential in shaping 
individuals’ attitudes, especially in cases in which one’s ingroup has low status (Bettencourt, 
Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001). Specifically, 
according to SIT, children who believe that their national identity (and thus their fortunes) are 
stable across time and place (i.e., children who hold an essentialist conception of national 
identity) may be less likely to oppose disparities that disadvantage their ingroup than are children 
who believe that their national identity—and likewise their intergroup status—is less stable (i.e., 
those who hold a nonessentialist conception of national identity)6. Therefore, SIT would predict  
children would demonstrate support for ingroup-favoring inequalities, regardless of whether they 
perceive national identity as an essentialized category. However, essentialism would influence 
their attitudes for outgroup-favoring inequalities, as children who hold an essentialist conception 
of national identity may be more likely to perceive their positions as existing within a stable 
hierarchy, and less likely to reject such a disparity outright. While an SIT account would predict 
such a pattern in children of all ages, because older children in the present study may be more 
like to be influenced by the system justification motives described above, I expect that an 
                                                             
6
 Earlier accounts of social identity theory have made the opposite prediction—specifically that in cases in which the 
stability of one’s identity reflects the stability and impermeability of intergroup boundaries, that low-status groups 
will show stronger ingroup favoritism, and less support for existing inequalities (e.g., Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, 
De Vries, & Wilke, 1988; Ellemers, Wilke, Van Knippenberg, 1993). While more recent evidence points to a 
positive relationship between identity (and status) stability and status quo support in low-status groups, the precise 
conditions under which low-status groups reject vs. support the status quo remains a topic for further inquiry in 
social identity theory research (Brown, 2000). 
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ingroup-favoring pattern of behavior to be most prevalent in younger children (e.g., 5- to -8-
year-olds; see Figure 4 for a graphical representation of the predictions).   
With respect to the third goal, I explore the mechanistic beliefs that underlie the predicted 
interactions between ingroup status and essentialism. Specifically, I test whether two beliefs that 
may follow from an essentialist conception of national identity influence children’s disparity 
endorsement (and differentially so, depending on the status of the ingroup). One such belief is 
the perceived immutability of national identity. If essentializing their national identity leads 
children to believe that this identity is immutable, then they may strongly support inequalities 
that currently—and, according to this belief, will always—benefit their national ingroup. In cases 
when the ingroup is disadvantaged, a strong belief in the immutability of one’s national identity 
(and thus one’s unfavorable position) may also promote a belief that intergroup disparities are 
stable and legitimate. Beliefs about the stability of ingroup-disadvantaging hierarchies have been 
linked with disparity support in both the system justification (e.g., Laurin et al., 2012; 2013) and 
social identity theory (e.g., Bettencourt et al., 2001) literatures, and thus may function similarly 
in children in the present study.  
A second potential belief that may influence children’s disparity support is the 
expectation of diminished intergroup contact (Gaither et al., 2014; Rhodes et al., in press). 
Specifically, essentialism of a social group might increase the belief that group boundaries are 
discrete, leading participants to expect little interaction with other groups. This effect may be 
especially pronounced in the case of national identity, as national groups do, for the most part, 
live in separate geographical spaces. Thus, if children who essentialize their nationality believe 
that they are unlikely to encounter members of other national groups, it may be easier for them to 
endorse perceived disparities that are unfavorable to such national outgroups. When children are 
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faced with disparities that favor the outgroup, a belief in diminished intergroup contact may 
increase support in older children, according to system justification theory, as it may be easier 
for them to satisfy system supporting motives and justify their own positions when they do not 
expect to have to confront their comparative misfortune. In contrast, according to a social 
identity theory perspective (likely most relevant for younger children in the present study), 
diminished intergroup contact may lead to ingroup-favoring (and thus disparity-rejecting) 
attitudes, as they may perceive a disparity with a foreign and largely absent outgroup as less 
salient and potentially less legitimate.  Thus, I expected that for older children (who are likely 
most susceptible to system justification motives), both perceived immutability of national 
identity and expectation of diminished intergroup contact would be related to increased support 
for all intergroup disparities. However, for younger children (whose attitudes are likely more 
consistent with a  social identity theory account), while I expected that perceived immutability of 
national identity would predict support for all intergroup disparities, I predicted that an 
expectation of intergroup contact would be positively related to support for only ingroup-
favoring disparities, and negatively related to support for outgroup-favoring disparities. 
To test the influence of essentialist thinking on children’s inequality beliefs, and tease 
apart the predictions spelled out by system justification theory- and social identity theory-based 
accounts, I conducted an experiment with children ranging in age from 5 to 12 years. This wide 
age range allowed me to also examine whether the predicted effects varied across development, 
and specifically whether children’s attitudes could be differentially explained by accounts of 
group-favoring (i.e., social identity theory) vs. system-supporting (i.e., system justification 
theory) motivations (see Figure 4). 
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Study 4 
Participants 
 Participants were 80 five- to twelve-year-old children (40 males, 40 females; Mage = 8.94 
years, SD = 1.97. Children were recruited in a small Midwestern city and tested either in a 
university lab (n = 38) or in a quiet room at their school (n = 42). An optional demographic 
survey was distributed, and revealed that a majority of participants were European American 
(64%) and came from homes in which their primary caregivers earned at least a Bachelor’s 
degree (60%). The median income ranged from $80,000-99,999.  
Materials  
 Essentialism manipulation. Children were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 
Pro- and Anti-Essentialism. In each condition, children were read a short storybook (adapted 
from Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015) that profiles three different children: an American, an 
Andorran, and a Moldovan.  
In the Pro-Essentialism book, each child was described as living in a town with only 
people of the same national identity (e.g., the American child lives in a town where all of the 
people are Americans), engaging exclusively in country-specific conventions (e.g., the American 
child recites the Pledge of Allegiance and attends 4th of July celebrations), and enjoying 
exclusively country-specific foods and games (e.g., the American child likes to eat hamburgers 
and play baseball). Thus, the Pro-Essentialism book suggested that people of different 
nationalities are fundamentally different (see Supplemental Materials for sample pages).  
In contrast, the Anti-Essentialism book described the children as living in culturally 
heterogeneous areas (e.g., the American child lives in a town where there are people from all 
sorts of countries), engaging in a variety of international celebrations (e.g., the American child 
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lives in a town where they also celebrate Chinese New Year), and visiting family and friends all 
over the world (e.g., the American child and his family visit his aunt, who lives in Egypt). Thus, 
the Anti-Essentialism book fosters the idea that nationality does not necessarily determine one’s 
preferences and behaviors, and that commonalities exist across national groups (see 
Supplemental Materials for sample pages).  
Throughout the book, children were asked several attention check questions (e.g., “Can 
you tell me what we just said about…?”), in order to ensure that they understood and 
remembered the material being presented. 
 Rationalization of inequalities. After reading the book, all children were presented with 
two scenarios to assess their beliefs about intergroup inequalities. In the ingroup-favoring 
scenario, Americans are portrayed as having more resources than an outgroup nationality 
(Moldovans); in the outgroup-favoring scenario, an outgroup (Andorrans) is described as having 
more resources than Americans. These two outgroups were those mentioned in the Pro- vs. Anti-
Essentialism storybooks. For both scenarios, children were asked four questions to gauge their 
support for the inequalities. Specifically, they were asked whether the situation is fair (6-pt 
scale), OK (6-pt scale), deserved (yes/no), and whether any money should be taken from the 
advantaged group to be given to the disadvantaged group (5-pt scale; “None” to “A ton”). 
Question order for each scenario was randomized, and children’s responses to each of the four 
questions was standardized and averaged to obtain a composite rationalization of inequality 
score (α = .68 for the ingroup-favoring scenario; α = .73 for the outgroup-favoring scenario). 
 Potential Mechanisms. Children then received two additional blocks of questions 
designed to assess the two mechanisms (i.e., perceived immutability of national identity, 
expectation of diminished intergroup contact) described above. To assess children’s beliefs about 
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the possibility that their national identity could change—and specifically that they might acquire 
the nationality of one of the two target outgroups—I asked them three questions. Specifically, I 
asked whether they think there is a chance that an American child could grow up and become an 
Andorran/Moldovan (yes/no), and also how easy or hard it would be for an American to become 
an Andorran/Moldovan and vice versa (both 4-pt scales, “Really easy” to “Really hard”). 
Question order was randomized, and responses were standardized and averaged into a composite 
immutability score (α = .43 for Moldovan outgroup; α = .48 for Andorran outgroup7). 
To assess children’s perceptions of intergroup contact, I asked them an additional three 
questions: (1) how often Americans and non-Americans (Moldovans or Andorrans) talk to one 
another (4-pt scale, “Never” to “All the time”), (2) how often they “hang out” with one another 
(4-pt scale, “Never” to “All the time”), and (3) how many of the target non-American group live 
in America (4-pt scale, “None” to “A whole lot”). All of these questions were averaged (within 
block) to obtain an intergroup contact composite score.  
In one block, children were asked questions about both of the above mechanisms as they 
relate to the low-status outgroup (e.g., how much contact they perceive Americans to have with 
Moldovans; α = .76 for Moldovan outgroup), and in the other block, they reported on their 
beliefs as they relate to the high-status outgroup (i.e., Andorrans; α = .64 for Andorran 
outgroup). This allowed me to observe whether the proposed mechanisms underlying the 
essentialism → inequality support relationship differed depending on whether one is evaluating a 
relatively higher- vs. lower-status group.  
 Manipulation checks. Finally, children were asked a series of five questions (in a fixed 
order) to assess the effectiveness of the essentialism manipulation. In the first two questions, they 
                                                             
7 Removing one item (“Is it possible for an American child to one day become an Andorran/Moldovan?”) drastically 
improved the reliability of this composite; however, it did not change the results of the main analyses presented 
below, so all items were retained. 
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were asked to provide justifications for their earlier answers of whether Americans deserve to 
have more money than Moldovans, and whether Andorrans deserve to have more money than 
Americans. These justifications were coded for essentialist language (e.g., appealing to inherent 
traits or features). The prediction is that children will use such language more often in the Pro- 
vs. the Anti-Essentialism condition. The final three questions assessed how stable children 
believe national identity to be. Using each of the three characters from the storybook they read, 
children were asked whether that character has always had their current nationality, and whether 
that character will always have that nationality. If the manipulation books are effective in 
altering children’s beliefs, children in the Pro-Essentialism condition should report nationality to 
be more stable than children in the Anti-Essentialism condition. 
Procedure 
 All children began the session by reading either the Pro- or Anti-Essentialism storybook. 
Immediately after reading the manipulation book, children received the two rationalization of 
inequality blocks, in counterbalanced order. Following these questions, children received the two 
blocks with mechanism measures, in counterbalanced order. Lastly, children received the 
manipulation check block. 
Results and discussion 
 Manipulation checks. As expected, children in the Pro-Essentialism condition provided 
more essentialist responses to the manipulation check questions than did children in the Anti-
Essentialism condition. Specifically, children in the Pro-Essentialism condition tended to refer 
more on inherent traits and features of national groups than did children in the Anti-Essentialism 
condition, when providing justification for their beliefs about whether one group deserved an 
advantage over another, although this difference was not statistically significant (45% vs. 28%, 
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respectively; t[78] = .78, p = .08). Further, children in the Pro-Essentialism condition viewed the 
nationality of the book characters as significantly more stable than did children in the Anti -
Essentialism condition, t(78) = 4.05, p < .001. Thus, the manipulation books appeared to have a 
significant impact on children’s tendency to view national identity as an essentialized and stable 
category. 
 Relationship between essentialism, ingroup status, and support for intergroup 
inequalities. As described earlier, system justification theory and social identity theory make 
distinct predictions as to how essentialism and relative ingroup status will influence children’s 
tendencies to support intergroup disparities. Specifically, SJT predicts that those who possess a 
fundamental motive to defend the status quo (i.e., likely 9-12-year-old children, in this sample) 
will generally demonstrate support for the intergroup disparities, and may do so even more in 
cases where their ingroup is disadvantaged (e.g., Jost et al., 2003). Further, this support may be 
heightened for those who essentialize national identity, to the extent that essentialism conveys 
the notion that the existing disparities are based on fundamental and legitimate group differences.  
For younger children (here, 5- to 8-year-olds), who are likely to be more influenced by 
ingroup-favoring (vs. system-supporting) motives, SIT predicts that they would demonstrate 
ingroup-favoring attitudes, generally supporting disparities that favor the ingroup, and rejecting 
those that favor the outgroup. However, for those children who essentialize national identity, 
outgroup-favoring disparities may appear more stable and legitimate (than for those who don’t 
essentialize national identity), leading them to show some mild support (see Figure 4 for a 
graphical representation of the predictions of the two accounts).  
As children’s attitudes were expected to vary according to age (and the associated 
differential motivations of SJT and SIT), I split the data into two age groups (5-8 years and 9-12 
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years), and included Age Group as a dichotomous variable in all of my models.8 In order to see 
whether children’s support for intergroup inequalities was based on a) essentialism manipulation 
condition (Pro- vs Anti-Essentialism) and b) relative ingroup status (high vs. low), I conducted a 
mixed-effects linear regression, predicting children’s composite rationalization of inequality on 
the basis of Essentialism (0 = Anti-Essentialism, 1 = Pro-Essentialism), Ingroup Status (0 = Low 
Status, 1 = High Status), and Age Group (0 = 5-8 years, 1 = 9-12 years) and their interactions, 
allowing subjects’ intercepts to vary randomly.  
The results of the regression revealed no significant main effects of Essentialism, Ingroup 
Status, or Age (see Table 10 for full regression results). There was, however, a significant Status 
x Essentialism interaction (b = −.56 [−.99, −.14], p = .010), a significant Status x Age interaction 
(b = −1.02 [−1.45, −.60], p < .001), as well as a significant three-way Status x Age x 
Essentialism interaction (b = .70 [.09, 1.31], p = .024.  The significant three-way interaction 
suggests that the influence of the essentialism manipulation and their ingroup’s relative status on 
children’s support for the intergroup inequalities was not uniform across childhood.  
To explore how children’s responses changed across development, I examined the Status 
x Condition interaction at each age group (i.e., 5-8-year-olds vs. 9-12-year-olds) for children in 
my sample (see Figure 5).  Younger children showed overall greater support for ingroup-
favoring (vs. outgroup-favoring) disparities, and this difference was most pronounced in the 
Anti-Essentialism condition, consistent with a social identity theory-based account. Specifically, 
there was a significant Status x Essentialism interaction, as well as a significant main effect of 
Status (ps = .01; see Table 11 for full results). In the Anti-Essentialism condition, young children 
showed significantly greater support for  the ingroup-favoring inequality (M = .21) than for the 
                                                             
8 Models in which Age was entered as a continuous variable yielded largely similar results and are included in the 
Supplemental Analyses. 
  
43 
 
ingroup-favoring inequality (M = -.40), 95% CI of the difference: [.31, .91]. However, in the Pro-
Essentialism condition, children’s support for the ingroup- vs. outgroup-favoring disparities did 
not differ (Mingroup-favoring = −.07; Moutgroup-favoring = −.11). Further, for both ingroup- and outgroup-
favoring disparities, children’s endorsement did not differ by essentialism condition (see Table 
12 for all means). Thus, the results for younger children—specifically their tendency to support 
ingroup-favoring disparities—lend support for a social identity theory-based account early in 
development. Also consistent with SIT, in the Anti-Essentialism condition, young children 
reacted strongly against outgroup-favoring disparities potentially reflecting their belief that such 
disparities were based on unstable or illegitimate differences (e.g., Bettencourt et al., 2001; 
Sidanius et al., 2001). in the Pro-Essentialism condition. For young children, then, essentializing 
national identity may add a degree of legitimacy to the intergroup disparities, leading to roughly 
equal support for ingroup- and outgroup-favoring disparities (in the Pro-Essentialism condition). 
However, when children don’t essentialize national identity, the intergroup disparities may 
appear less legitimate, and thus invoke less support when they disadvantage the ingroup. 
In contrast, older children showed a general tendency to support outgroup-favoring 
disparities more than ingroup-favoring disparities, particularly when they held essentialist 
conceptions of national identity. These results are consistent with a motivated system 
justification account, whereby people seek to rationalize their positions by justifying the larger 
system (especially when their positions are unfavorable). For older children, the Status x 
Essentialism interaction was not significant (p = .53); however, there was a significant main 
effect of Status (p =.002; see Table 11 and Figure 5). In contrast with the younger children, older 
children showed the strongest overall support for the outgroup-favoring inequality in the Pro-
Essentialism condition (M = .36), and this was significantly above zero (the standardized mean; 
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95% CI of the difference: [.05, .68]; see Table 12 for all means). These results suggest that older 
children’s pattern of endorsement are somewhat consistent with a system justification theory 
account of intergroup cognition, whereby low-status groups may be motivated to rationalize their 
own unfavorable positions—to an even greater extent than their high-status counterparts—by 
legitimizing the overall hierarchical system (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2003). 
 Influence of the proposed mechanistic beliefs on children’s attitudes toward 
inequalities. To investigate what predicted children’s differential support for ingroup- vs. 
outgroup-favoring disparities, I examined their perceptions of nationality immutability and 
intergroup contact. Children’s beliefs about the immutability of national identity as well as the 
likelihood of intergroup contact were highly similar when considering both advantaged (i.e., 
Andorran) and disadvantaged (i.e., Moldovan) target outgroups (immutability: t[78] = .049, p = 
.96; intergroup contact: t[78] = .42, p = .68; see Table 11 for all means). Given this, I collapsed 
children’s scores across status manipulations so that each child had a single immutability and a 
single likelihood of intergroup contact score. Additionally, as the pattern of children’s disparity 
endorsement differed significantly with age (with younger children rejecting, and older children 
supporting, outgroup-favoring inequalities), I also examined the influence of the proposed 
mediators separately for children ages 5-8 (n = 41) and children ages 9-12 (n = 39). 
 Contrary to the predictions laid out earlier, children’s immutability and likelihood of 
intergroup contact beliefs did not differ by essentialism condition at any age (all ps > .1), and 
thus they did not mediate the pathways between essentialism and disparity support (all ab 
pathway ps > .2). As children in the current sample were all recruited from a highly diverse 
college town, it’s likely that the short storybook read to them at the beginning of the study was 
not a strong enough manipulation to counteract their preexisting beliefs about the likelihood of 
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encountering or becoming a member of a different national group. Although it’s impossible to 
make definitive conclusions given the present data, this possibility is supported by the fact that 
older children—who have likely had more experience learning about and interacting with non-
Americans—show even smaller condition differences on the proposed mechanistic beliefs than 
do younger children (although there is no significant interaction with age). Thus, future 
investigations into these mechanisms may require a more intensive manipulation of essentialist 
thinking. 
 While children’s beliefs about nationality immutability or the likelihood of intergroup 
contact did not vary by manipulation condition, they were related to disparity support for the 5- 
to 8-year-old children.  Nationality immutability beliefs, for instance, were positively and 
significantly related to their support for ingroup- as well as outgroup-favoring disparities (rs = 
.37 and .39, respectively; see Table 13 for full correlation matrix). Their perceptions of increased 
intergroup contact, however were only significantly related to their endorsement of outgroup-
favoring disparities (r = .43), implying that the less children expected to interact with a high-
status outgroup, the less likely they were to support an outgroup-favoring disparity. As described 
earlier, this is consistent with a social identity theory account, whereby diminished contact with a 
high-status outgroup may increase perceptions of disparity illegitimacy or instability, and thus 
lead children to reject the inequality. Older children’s (9- to 12-year-olds) disparity support was 
not significantly related to either of the proposed mechanisms, leaving open an important 
question of what precisely drives their support for outgroup-favoring disparities (see the General 
Discussion for speculation on this topic). 
Conclusion. As expected, manipulating children’s essentialist beliefs about national 
identity and their ingroup’s status did not uniformly predict their tendency to rationalize 
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intergroup inequalities. However, support was found for both a system justification theory- and 
social identity theory-based predictions of children’s intergroup attitudes. Specifically, while 
young children’s beliefs appear to be influenced by self- and group-esteem motives, older 
children’s attitudes may be influenced by a drive to defend the status quo. Strikingly, this 
resulted in a shift from a tendency to support ingroup-advantaging inequalities early in childhood 
to a tendency to favor outgroup-advantaging inequalities in late childhood. This dramatic switch 
highlights an important developmental change in early national group reasoning, and presents a 
fruitful avenue for future research. 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
I predicted that from a young age, children’s reasoning about national identity would 
show hallmarks of essentialist thinking, and that the tendency to hold essentialist beliefs would 
decrease with age. I also predicted that, even as the tendency to essentialize national identity 
declines, essentialist thinking would still have a significant impact on how children view and 
treat others.  
In line with my first prediction, I found that children’s essentialism significantly 
decreased with age when they were considering both their own (i.e., American identity), as well 
as an outgroup national identity. These results point to a domain-wide relationship between 
nationality essentialism and age, such that the nature of children’s conceptualizations apply to 
the category “national identity” more broadly, as opposed to any one specific national group. 
However, the fact that age-related decline in essentialism was steeper for Canadian targets than 
for American targets in Study 2 does hint at some differentiation in children’s national identity 
beliefs depending on the target. This result can be interpreted in two possible ways. One way is 
to assume that older children are even more aware of the extrinsic and circumstantial factors that 
comprise outgroup (vs. ingroup) national identity. This may be especially relevant for the 
children in my studies, who largely grew up in a fairly diverse college town. Thus, it’s likely that 
they have encountered several individuals who, while originating in a foreign country, consider 
themselves to be Americans. Therefore, children may have increasing exposure (as they age) to 
people shedding some of the hallmarks of their outgroup national identity (e.g., liking certain 
foods) in order to assimilate into American life. In contrast, they may have limited (if any) 
exposure to native-born Americans renouncing their birth nationality, and thus may perceive 
American national identity as more stable or biologically-rooted than an outgroup identity.  
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Alternatively, one could interpret the present findings as reflecting children’s increasing 
beliefs that an outgroup identity is less informative, or meaningful than their ingroup identity. 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), people tend to view outgroups as 
homogenous and consider their identities as less significant than, and in some cases inferior to, 
one’s own. Here, if older American children view Canadian national identity as less informative 
for predicting behavior and less likely to be an inherited, biological trait than American identity, 
it could reflect a more fundamental belief that an outgroup identity is less meaningful than the 
ingroup identity. Relatedly, this view may help to fuel the exceptionalist view of American 
national identity that is endorsed even by young children (Hess & Torney, 1976). Further 
investigation into children’s differential conceptions of national identities depending on their 
group status (in- vs. outgroup) would likely provide a great deal of insight into early group 
behavior. However, the cumulative finding from Studies 1-3 that essentialism of national identity 
declines across childhood provides strong evidence for a domain-wide developmental shift in 
children’s conceptions of nationality. 
In support of my second prediction, I also found that essentialism of one’s own national 
identity has important consequences for how one views members of national outgroups. In Study 
3, children who had a more essentialist view of their American identity were more likely to 
endorse and justify inequalities between Americans and non-Americans. Thus, believing that 
one’s nationality is a stable, immutable trait appears to license the belief that those who share the 
same essential features (i.e., the national ingroup) deserve advantages over those who do not. In 
Study 4, the relationship between essentialism and rationalization of inequalities was revealed to 
be more nuanced. Specifically, while young children (5-8-year-olds) tended to reject disparities 
in which Americans had relatively low status, older children (10-12-year-olds) demonstrated 
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strong support for such outgroup-favoring inequalities. Further, older children’s support was 
unrelated to their beliefs about the immutability of their national identity, or the extent to which 
they believe intergroup contact is likely, suggesting that there may be other factors, unexplored 
here, that influence older children’s reasoning about intergroup disparities.  
Together, these results provide a first look into the influence of essentialist conceptions 
on children’s perceptions and treatment of members of various national groups. While the 
tendency to essentialize national identity declined significantly with age, believing that 
nationality is a stable and inherent feature of one’s self influenced children’s support for 
intergroup inequalities. Future work should continue to explore older children’s and adolescents’ 
national identity beliefs, in order to better understand the various cognitive and social processes 
that shape national group-based attitudes in adulthood. Doing so will provide a more complete 
developmental picture of certain nationality-based attitudes and prejudices present in adults (e.g., 
Huynh, Devos, & Altman, 2015; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009).  
Unanswered questions and future directions 
The research described above presents an important first look into children’s early 
conceptualizations of national identity, and raises additional questions for future research to 
explore. One question that Study 3 raises is why essentialism of national identity strongly 
predicted rationalization of intergroup inequalities, but did not predict more positively valenced 
attributions of the ingroup over the outgroup. One possibility, raised earlier, is that the results of 
the outgroup prejudice task simply reflect a broad tendency to favor the ingroup (and derogate 
the outgroup) that acts independently of children’s beliefs about whether the ingroup is 
comprised of a collection of individuals who share a single, causal essence (e.g., Brewer, 1999; 
Dunham et al, 2011). Given that adult Americans consistently endorse the belief that the United 
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States is one of the greatest countries in the world (Tyson, 2014), and American children as 
young as 7 have demonstrated a strong sense of national pride (Hess & Torney, 1967), an 
“Americans = good” association may have dominated children’s reasoning on our stereotyping 
task, regardless of what they believed the origins of their national identity to be. Another 
possibility is that essentialism leads to a belief that category boundaries are discrete and 
impermeable. However, believing that the outgroup consists of fundamentally different and 
foreign individuals may not be enough to license explicitly prejudiced beliefs, as demonstrated 
by children’s willingness to endorse outgroup-favoring disparities in Study 4.  It should remain 
an important goal of future research to continue to investigate the developmental origins of 
national group prejudice, and what specific factors contribute to prejudiced attitudes and 
behaviors.  
Perhaps the most pressing, and potentially promising, task for future research on early 
national group attitudes is to better document and investigate the striking shift in children’s 
outgroup-oriented attitudes revealed in Study 4. While younger (5-8-year-old) children appeared 
to strongly reject inequalities that disadvantaged Americans—particularly when those 
inequalities appeared arbitrary and potentially illegitimate (i.e., in the Anti-Essentialism 
condition), older children (9-12-year-olds) tended to show support for outgroup-favoring 
disparities, suggesting that a near-reversal of attitudes towards ingroup-disadvantaging 
inequalities. What might lead to such a drastic shift in attitudes? Although the data in Study 4 do 
not offer definitive answers, past research on children’s and adults’ intergroup attitudes provide 
some potential explanations for the developmental trend observed. Socio-cognitive theory (ST; 
Aboud, 1988) argues that children’s intergroup attitudes are in part shaped by their perceptual-
cognitive abilities. More specifically, before the age of 8, children rely largely on perceptual 
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features (e.g., skin color) or category markers (e.g., American vs. Non-American) to differentiate 
between groups, and on this basis, develop a robust ingroup preference. However, as children’s 
cognitive capacities develop, they become better at perceiving people as individuals, and not 
simply representative of a certain group. According to ST, this brings about a change both in 
children’s inter- and intra-group attitudes, leading to more positive outgroup-oriented attitudes, 
and less positive ingroup-oriented attitudes (e.g., Doyle, Beaudet, & Aboud, 1988; Nesdale, 
Lawson, Durkin, & Duffy, 2010) than younger children. In certain cases, older children—like 
those in Study 4—have even demonstrated outgroup preferences, favoring conditions that 
disadvantage the ingroup (e.g., Doyle et al., 1988; Verkuyten & De Wolf, 2007). Previous work 
on children’s tendencies to rectify or perpetuate inequalities also found that, similar to the 
children in Study 4, 8-10-year-olds were more likely to distribute resources to underprivileged 
group (even when it was a salient outgroup), while 5-7-year-olds were more likely to distribute 
resources to an advantaged group (Olson, Dweck, Spelke, & Banaji, 2011). Thus, an important 
shift in children’s cognitive capabilities that occurs around middle childhood may in part explain 
why they show support for outgroup-favoring inequalities.  
This tendency to favor outgroup-advantaging disparities as a result of the development of 
certain cognitive capacities (e.g., perspective-taking) may have been exacerbated in Study 4 by 
older children’s perceptions of the current political climate. When asked to explain their disparity 
support positions for instance, several older children invoked Donald Trump (e.g., “[he’s] not a 
good guy”) and Americans’ anti-immigration attitudes (e.g., “[Moldovans] might come here and 
Americans might not want them here, and that would be really hard”), suggesting that their 
outgroup-oriented support may be in part driven by their exposure to recent pro-nationalist and 
anti-immigration messages. Further investigation into precisely what sociopolitical messages 
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children receive from their environment, and the consequences they have may shed further light 
onto older children’s integration of political attitudes into their intergroup behavior.  
A second alternative, described in Study 4, is provided by system justification theory 
(SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994). According to SJT, people are motivated to justify the systems in 
which they are embedded, at least in part as a means of rationalizing their own position within 
that system. Thus, when individuals or groups find themselves in disadvantaged positions, they 
may endeavor to reduce the negative emotions that accompany such positions by endorsing the 
larger social structure (e.g., “If everything is as it’s supposed to be, then I’m right where I 
belong”). Although this motivational pathway has almost exclusively been studied in adults, the 
responses of the older children in Study 4 may have in part been due to certain motivational 
interests. By 4th grade, children are certainly aware of important characteristics of their society, 
and thus may be experiencing a motivation to view their society as fair and just. Thus, when 
presented with a situation in which Americans have low status and fewer resources than an 
outgroup, older children may have experienced a certain degree of uncertainty or negative 
emotions about their positions. As a result, they may been motivated to rationalize their 
disadvantaged position by vocalizing support for the disparity, in order to alleviate any anxiety 
they felt. This interpretation mirrors findings with adults and adolescents, in which lower-status 
groups display more system justifying behaviors (e.g., opposing protest, vocalizing support) than 
their higher-status counterparts (e.g., Henry & Saul, 2006; Jost et al., 2003; cf. Brandt, 2013).  
Both the socio-cognitive theory and system justification theory accounts of older 
children’s intergroup attitudes provide promising avenues for future research, including further 
exploring how environmental and cognitive factors interact to shape social group cognition 
across development. Further work should also address the growing gap between an apparent 
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weakening of ingroup-favoring attitudes in late childhood and the recent global rise in 
nationalism (the belief that one’s country is superior to others) in adults (“League of 
Nationalists”, 2016). For instance, in his inaugural address, President Donald Trump declared 
that “from this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this moment on, it’s going 
to be America First” (Blake, 2017). Such a public declaration of national ingroup dominance, 
which has been echoed in in parliaments and chambers across the globe, lies in stark contrast 
with the outgroup-favoring attitudes espoused by the older children in Study 4. Therefore 
uncovering both the underlying psychological and environmental conditions that influence 
national group attitudes as children and adolescence reach adulthood may prove important to 
gaining a better understand the rapidly shifting international landscape. 
Finally, expanding the scope of this research to include samples from other nations is 
critical in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of national identity conceptions 
early on, and to also understand how various cultural environments differentially influence 
children’s understanding of their national identity (e.g., Carrington & Short, 1995; 1996; Howard 
& Gill, 2001). Equally important is understanding what sort of individual difference variables 
and environmental factors predict essentialism of national identity, and downstream behaviors 
such as justification of intergroup inequalities. Although demographic factors such as parental 
income and education did not appear to relate to children’s beliefs in the present studies, a more 
comprehensive investigation of national identity beliefs would certainly include greater 
sociodemographic diversity. 
As globalization and international immigration continue to rise, the lines between 
national groups are continually crossed. Thus, understanding the roots of national group-based 
prejudices will become an increasingly important goal of developmental research. I believe that 
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the present research provides an important first step in understanding precisely how 
psychological essentialism shapes young children’s conceptions of national identity and the key 
consequences it has for their interactions with the world around them. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1 
Sample essentialist and non-essentialist responses to the open-ended measures in Study 1 
  
Task Essentialist response 
Non-essentialist 
response 
Conventions: 
Americans eat apple 
pie 
“Because a lot of 
[Americans] have a 
sweet tooth” 
“Because there’s a lot 
of apple trees around 
here” 
Conventions: 
Americans watch 
baseball games 
“Because baseball 
players talk 
English…” 
“Because there’s 
more baseball players 
here” 
Conventions: 
Americans watch 
fireworks shows 
“Because they’re for 
celebrating a 
president…they 
celebrate freedom” 
“Because some 
[countries] can’t have 
fireworks because it’s 
the law” 
Meaning (“What 
does it mean to be an 
American?”) 
“It means to talk 
English and 
sometimes you wear 
red to respect the 
flag” 
“That you live in 
America” 
Acquisition (“How do 
you become an 
American?”) 
“…speaking English 
and doing stuff 
Americans do” 
“[You were] born 
there or [you] sail 
there on a ship” 
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Table 2 
Average scores on the essentialism measures from Studies 1-3 
 Essentialism Task Study 1 
Study 2 
(American 
Target) 
Study 2 
(Canadian 
Target) 
Study 3 
     
 Stability .62 (.30) .68 (.29) .45 (.25) .64 (.25) 
 Heritability .40 (.31) .41 (.34) .42 (.37) .46 (.36) 
 Biological Nature .30 (.35) .30 (.34) .34 (.37) .24 (.28) 
            Inductive Potential .78 (.30) -- -- .76 (.32) 
            Conventions .36 (.33) -- -- -- 
 Meaning .68 (.47) -- -- -- 
 Acquisition .21 (.41) -- -- -- 
         Standard deviations are depicted in parentheses.  
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Table 3 
Inter-correlations Among the Measures of Essentialism and Participants’ Age in Study 1 
N = 70. †p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
  
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
         
1. Participant Age   1 .06 −.20 −.40** .004  −.17 
 
−.09 −.22† 
2. Essent.: Stability   1 .04 .03 .21†  −.04 −.12 −.22† 
3. Essent.: Heritability    1 .16 −.12   .03 .24* .19 
4. Essent.: Biol. Nature      1 −.35**  .34** .22† .06 
5. Essent.: Inductive Pot.       1 − .02 −.15 .02 
6. Essent.: Conventions 
 
       1   .19   .20 
7. Essent.: Meaning       1 .34** 
34** 
8. Essent.: Acquisition        1 
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Table 4 
Linear mixed-effects regression predicting children’s essentialist beliefs on the basis of age in 
Study 1 
Fixed Effects Estimate SE 95% CI 
(Intercept) 1.02 .11   
Age −.04 .01 −.07 −.02 
 
Task Effects  
(vs. Stability) 
    
Task: Heritability −.22* .06 −.34 −.11 
Task: Inductive Potential .15* .06 .04 .27 
Task: Biological Nature −.33* .06 −.44 −.21 
Task: Conventions −.27* .06 −.38 −.16 
Task: Meaning .06 .06 −.05 .17 
Task: Acquisition −.42* .06 −.53 −.30 
 
Interaction Effects  
(vs. Stability x Age) 
    
Heritability x Age −.06 .05 −.15 .03 
Inductive Pot. x Age −.01 .05 −.10 .07 
Biol. Nature x Age −.13* .05 −.21 −.04 
Conventions x Age −.07 .05 −.16 .02 
Meaning x Age −.05 .05 −.14 .04 
Acquisition x Age −.09 .05 −.18 .001 
     
Random Effects   SD  
Grouping variable: Subject  Intercept .09  
 
       Note. Observations: 486; Subjects: 70. Task estimates indicate differences  
      in endorsement from Stability. Interaction estimates indicate differences in 
      developmental trajectory from Stability. * = significant coefficient, p < .05. 
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Table 5 
Inter-correlations Among the Measures of Essentialism and Participants’ Age in Study 2 
      N = 70. p < .05. ** p < .01. ***p < .001 
  
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
        
1. Participant Age   1 .26* −.19 −.30* .05  −.34** 
 
−.32** 
2. American Ess.: Stability   1 .12 −.07 .45**  .07 −.05 
3. American Ess.: Heritability    1 .07 .18  .76** 
ff.07..7
5**.76
*** 
.10 
4. American Ess.: Biol. Nature      1 .07  .09 .68*** 
5. Canadian Ess.: Stability       1  .17 .01 
6. Canadian Ess.: Heritability 
 
       1 .15 
7. Canadian Ess.: Biol. Nature        1 
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Table 6 
Linear mixed-effects regression predicting children’s essentialist beliefs on the basis of age and 
target nationality in Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Observations: 419; Subjects: 70; Task estimates indicate differences  
in endorsement from Stability. Task x Age interaction estimates indicate  
differences in developmental trajectory from Stability. Nationality x Task  
interaction estimates indicate differences in Nationality effect in  
Heritability and Biological Nature (separate coefficients) vs. Nationality  
effect in Stability. Nationality x Age interaction estimate indicates the  
difference in developmental trajectory of Canadian essentialism from  
American essentialism. American = 0, Canadian = 1. 
* = significant difference. 
  
Fixed Effects Estimate SE 95% CI 
(Intercept) .99 .13   
Age −.03 .02 −.07 .001 
Target Nationality 
 
−.02 .03 −.07 .04 
Task Effects     
(vs. Stability)     
Task: Heritability −.22* .03 −.29 −.15 
Task: Biological Nature 
 
−.34* .03 −.41 −.28 
Task x Age Interactions     
(vs. Stability x Age)     
Heritability x Age −.08* .03 −.14 −.03 
Bio. Nature x Age 
 
−.13* .03 −.18 −.07 
Nationality x Task Interactions 
(vs. Nationality x Stability) 
    
Nationality x Heritability .02 .07 −.11 .15 
Nationality x Bio. Nature .10 .07 −.04 .23 
 
Nationality x Age −.06* .02 −.11 −.02 
 
 
    
Random Effects   SD 
Grouping variable: Subject  Intercept .14 
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Table 7 
Inter-correlations Among the Measures of Essentialism, Participants’ Age, and Outgroup 
Attitudes in Study 3 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
        
1. Participant Age   1 .04 −.38** −.13 −.23*  .05 
 
−.15 
2. Essent.: Stability   1 −.12 −.17 .04  .11 .25* 
3. Essent.: Heritability    1 .22† .05  .12 .24* 
4. Essent.: Biol. Nature      1 −.14  −.12 .20† 
5. Essent.: Inductive Pot.       1 −.13 .05 
6. Outgroup Prejudice 
 
       1 .14 
7. Rationalization of Inequality       1 
        
 
     N = 72. †p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
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Table 8 
Linear mixed-effects regression predicting children’s essentialist beliefs on the basis of age  in 
Study 3 
Fixed Effects Estimate SE 95% CI 
(Intercept) 1.02 .12   
Age 
 
−.05 .02 −.08 −.02 
Task Effects     
(vs. Stability)     
Task: Heritability −.18* .05 −.28 −.08 
Task: Inductive Potential .11* .05 .02 .21 
Task: Biological Nature 
 
−.40* .05 −.50 −.30 
Interaction Effects     
(vs. Stability x Age)     
Heritability x Age −.13* .04 −.22 −.04 
Inductive Pot. x Age −.08 .04 −.16 .01 
Bio. Nature x Age −.04 .04 −.13 .04 
 
 
    
Random Effects   SD  
Grouping variable: Subject  Intercept <.001  
 
             Note. Observations: 288; Subjects: 72; Task estimates indicate differences  
             in endorsement from Stability. Interaction estimates indicate differences in 
             developmental trajectory from Stability. * = significant difference. 
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Table 9 
Linear regression predicting children’s rationalization of intergroup inequalities on the basis of 
essentialist beliefs and age in Study 3 
 
 Predictor  β  t  p 
    
 Participant Age −.04 −.29 .77 
 Essentialism: Stability .31** 2.71 .009 
 Essentialism: Heritability .22† 1.80 .08 
            Essentialism: Biological Nature .20† 1.72 .09 
            Essentialism: Inductive Potential .04 .37 .71 
 R2 total 17.7%   
 F 2.85*   
 N 72   
    
       †p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 10 
Linear mixed-effects regression predicting children’s rationalization of intergroup inequalities 
on the basis of age group, ingroup status, and manipulation condition in Study 4 
Fixed Effects Estimate SE              95% CI 
(Intercept) −.40 .15   
Age Group .17 .14 −.08 .45 
Ingroup Status .003 .08 −.15 .16 
Essentialism Condition .13 .14 −.14 .39 
Status x Essentialism Interaction 
(vs. Low Status x Anti-Essen.) 
    
High Status x Pro-Essen. −.56* .22 −.99 −.14 
 
Status x Age Group Interaction 
(vs. Low Status x Younger Children) 
    
High Status x Older Children −1.02* .22 −1.45 −.60 
 
Essentialism x Age Group Interaction 
(vs. Anti-Essen. x Younger Children) 
    
Pro-Essen. x Older Children −.10 .31 −.72 .52 
     
Status x Essentialism x Age Group 
Interaction 
(vs. Low Status x Anti-Essen. x Younger 
Children) 
    
High Status x Pro-Essen. x Older Children
  
.70* .31 .09 1.31 
 
 
    
Random Effects   SD  
Grouping variable: Subject  Intercept .06  
 
Note. Observations: 160; Subjects: 80; * = significant difference. 
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Table 11 
Results of the Status x Condition interaction by age group (in years) in Study 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < .05. Because each interaction contained 1 degree of freedom, the χ 2 value 
is numerically equivalent to an F value. 
Age Group χ2(F) p-value 
Young (5-8-year-olds) 6.73* .01 
Old (9-12-year-olds) .39 .53 
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Table 12 
Average standardized disparity endorsement by participant age group in Study 4 
Age Group 
Pro-Essentialism 
Americans =  
High Status 
Anti-Essentialism 
Americans = High 
Status 
Pro-
Essentialism 
Americans = 
Low Status 
Anti-
Essentialism 
Americans = 
Low Status 
     
      Young −.07 (.16) .21 (.15) −.11 (.16) −.40** (.15) 
        Old .09 (.16) −.24 (.16) .36* (.16) .18 (.16) 
     
Standard errors are depicted in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05, mean difference are calculated 
from 0.  
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Table 13 
Inter-correlations among the Inequality Rationalization, Nationality Immutability, and 
Likelihood of Intergroup Contact items for 5-8-year-olds in Study 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            N = 41. * p < .05. ** p < .01.  
  1. 2. 3. 4. 
     
 1. Ingroup-favoring Disparity Support   1 .48** .39* .43** 
 2. Outgroup-favoring Disparity Support   1 .37* .07 
 3. Nationality Immutability    1 .22 
 4. Likelihood of Intergroup Contact      1 
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Table 14 
Inter-correlations among the Inequality Rationalization, Nationality Immutability, and 
Likelihood of Intergroup Contact items for 9-12-year-olds in Study 4 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 
     
 1. Ingroup-favoring Disparity Support   1 .53** .20 .04 
 2. Outgroup-favoring Disparity Support   1 .16 .14 
 3. Nationality Immutability    1 .23 
 4. Likelihood of Intergroup Contact      1 
     
N = 39. ** p < .01.  
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Figure 1. The predicted negative relationship between age and essentialism measures in  
Study 1 (b = −.04, p = .002; 95% confidence intervals shown). 
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Figure 2. The predicted negative relationship between age and essentialism measures in 
Study 2  (b = −.03, p =. 06; 95% confidence intervals shown). 
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Figure 3. The predicted negative relationship between age and essentialism measures in 
 Study 3 (b = −.05, p =. 001; 95% confidence intervals shown). 
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Figure 4. A graphical representation of children’s predicted disparity support in Study 4, 
according to system justification and social identity theories. Based on prior developmental 
work, I expected that older children’s (9- to 12-year-olds) attitudes would resemble those 
predicted by SJT, while younger children’s (5- to 8-year-olds) attitudes would resemble those 
predicted by SIT.  
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Figure 5. The results of the Status x Essentialism interaction (predicting Inequality 
Rationalization) by Age Group (5-8-year-olds vs. 9-12-year-olds) in Study 4.  
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS 
 
Study 3: Adapted PRAM task (12 items) 
1. Here are two little boys9. One of them is a kind little boy. He always gives classmates 
hugs when they’re sad. Which is the kind little boy? 
2. Here are two little boys. One of them is a nice little boy. He always looks after his 
friends who need help. Which is the nice little boy? 
3. Here are two little boys. One of them is a smart little boy. He can answer even the 
hardest questions from his teacher. Which is the smart little boy? 
4. Here are two little boys. One of them is a friendly little boy. He is friends with 
everyone in his class. Which is the friendly little boy? 
5. Here are two little boys. One of them is a helpful little boy. He always helps his 
teacher clean the classroom. Which is the helpful little boy? 
6. Here are two little boys. One of them is a wonderful little boy. He makes everyone 
around him smile. Which is the wonderful little boy? 
7. Here are two little boys. One of them is a mean little boy. He likes to make fun of his 
classmates. Which is the mean little boy? 
8. Here are two little boys. One of them is a naughty little boy. He never cleans up his 
toys. Which is the naughty little boy?  
9. Here are two little boys. One of them is a careless little boy. He hurt himself while 
running around near the swimming pool. Which is the careless little boy? 
10. Here are two little boys. One of them is an unfriendly little boy. He always gets into 
fights with his friends. Which is the unfriendly little boy? 
11. Here are two little boys. One of them is a selfish little boy. He doesn’t share his toys 
with his brother. Which is the selfish little boy? 
12. Here are two little boys. One of them is a grumpy little boy. He refused to play with 
his classmates, even when they asked nicely. Which is the grumpy little boy? 
 
Study 3: Adapted rationalization of inequality vignettes 
1. Do you remember how we talked about people from America and people from other 
countries? Now, we are going to talk about people from America and people from Daxia. 
There are lots of things that are the same about Americans and Daxians. They go to 
grocery shopping, they like pancakes, and they both like to watch sports. But, there’s one 
thing that’s different about Americans and Daxians. Americans tend to have a lot more 
money than Daxians. 
 
                                                             
9
 Gender of the target was matched to participant gender 
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2. Do you remember how we talked about people from America and people from other 
countries? Now, we are going to talk about people from America and people from Coria.  
There are lots of things that are the same about Americans and Corians. They both like to 
watch movies, they like to eat pizza, and they like to see their friends. But, there’s one 
thing that’s different about Americans and Corians. Americans tend to live in much nicer 
houses than Corians 
 
Study 4: Manipulation Book Text Sample 
Pro-Essentialism Condition, American: 
[Page 1] This is Garret. Garret was born to American parents, and so he is also an American. He 
grew up in a town in America where all of the people are Americans. In Garret’s town, 
everybody speaks English and does the same things together. 
[Page 2] For instance, every morning at school, they say the Pledge of Allegiance, and 
on the 4th of July, they celebrate with a huge town parade. 
[Page 3] The people in Garret’s town also like to eat American foods, like hamburgers 
and barbeque, and play American sports, like football and baseball. 
[Page 4] Garret loves his family. He especially loves his two older brothers. Garret’s 
brothers got married to American women. Now, they have cute children, who are 
Americans, of course, and who Garret likes to play with. 
 
Anti-Essentialism Condition, American: 
[Page 1] This is Garret. Garret was born to American parents, and he is also an 
American. He grew up in a town in America where there are people from all different 
countries. In Garret’s town, the people speak lots of different languages, like Chinese and 
Spanish. 
[Page 2] In Garret’s town, the people celebrate the holidays from countries all over the 
world. For instance, the town has a big parade for Chinese New Year and puts on a 
special play for Brazilian Carnivale. 
[Page 3] Garret’s family loves to travel all over the world, so Garret has been to lots of 
different countries, like Canada, France and Egypt. He loves to try different foods and 
meet new people everywhere he visits. 
[Page 4] Garret loves to visit his aunt, who lives in Egypt. He’s noticed that the kids in 
Egypt like a lot of the same things he does, like soccer and ice cream. Garret thinks that 
one day it might be nice to become Egyptian, like his aunt. 
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Supplemental Analyses 
 
Linear mixed-effects regression predicting children’s rationalization of intergroup inequalities 
on the basis of age (as a continuous variable), ingroup status, and manipulation condition in 
Study 4 
Fixed Effects Estimate SE              95% CI 
(Intercept) −1.78 .51   
Age .08* .03 .02 .15 
Ingroup Status .003 .08 −.15 .16 
Essentialism Condition .13 .13 −.13 .39 
Status x Condition Interaction 
(vs. Low Status x Anti-Essen.) 
    
High Status x Pro-Essen. −1.82* .75 −3.29 −.35 
 
Status x Age Interaction 
(vs. Low Status x Age) 
    
High Status x Age −.24* .06 −.35 −.12 
 
Condition x Age Interaction 
(vs. Anti-Essen. x Age) 
    
Pro-Essen. x Age −.06 .08 −.21 .10 
     
Status x Condition x Age Interaction 
(vs. Low Status x Anti-Essen. x Age) 
    
High Status x Pro-Essen. x Age  .18* .08 .02 .34 
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Results of the Status x Condition interaction by age (in years) in Study 4 
Age χ2(F) p-value 
5 6.62* .01 
6 6.71* .01 
7 6.48* .01 
8 4.94* .03 
9 1.84 .17 
10 .05 .83 
11 .35 .55 
12 1.12 .29 
* p < .05. Because each interaction contained 1 degree of freedom, the χ 2 value 
is numerically equivalent to an F value. 
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Average standardized disparity endorsement by participant age (in years) in Study 4 
 Age 
Pro-Essentialism 
Americans =  
High Status 
Anti-Essentialism 
Americans = 
High Status 
Pro-Essentialism 
Americans = 
Low Status 
Anti-Essentialism 
Americans = 
Low Status 
     
 5 −.27 (.25) .20 (.25) −.39 (.25) −.85** (.25) 
 6 −.20 (.20) .15 (.20) −.26 (.20) −.67** (.20) 
 7 −.13 (.16) .09 (.15) −.13 (.16) −.48** (.15) 
            8 −.06 (.12) .04 (.12) <.001 (.12) −.30* (.12) 
            9 .02 (.11) −.01 (.11) .13 (.11) −.11 (.11) 
 10 .09 (.13) −.06 (.12) .26* (.13) .07 (.12) 
 11 .16 (.16) −.11 (.16) .39* (.16) .26 (.16) 
            12 .23 (.21) −.16 (.20) .52* (.21) .44* (.20) 
     
Standard errors are depicted in parentheses. ** p < .01; * p < .05, mean difference are calculated 
from 0. 
